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Abstract
During World War I (1914{1918) the birth rates of countries such as France,
Germany, the U.K., Belgium and Italy fell by almost 50%. In France, where
the population was 40 millions in 1914, the decit of births is estimated at
1.4 millions over 4 years while military losses are estimated at 1.4 millions too.
Thus, the fertility decline doubled the demographic impact of the war. Why did
fertility decline so much? The conventional wisdom is that fertility fell below
its optimal level because of the absence of men gone to war. I challenge this
view using the case of France. I construct a model of optimal fertility choice
where a household in its childbearing years during the war faces three shocks:
(i) an increased probability that its wife remains alone after the war; (ii) a
partially-compensated loss of its husband's income; and (iii) a decline in labor
productivity. I calibrate the model's parameters to the time series of fertility
before the war and use military casualties and income data to calibrate the
shocks representing the war. The model over-predicts the fertility decline by
10% even though it does not feature any physical separations of couples. It also
over-predicts the increase in fertility after the war, and generates a temporary
increase in the age at birth as observed in the French data.
Thanks to Patrick Festy for pointing out relevant data sources and sharing some of his own data.
Thanks to John Knowles, Juan Carrillo, Cezar Santos and Oksana Leukhina for useful comments.
All errors are mine.
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1 Introduction
The First World War lasted four years, from 1914 to 1918, and ravaged European
countries to an extent that had never been seen until then. During the war, the birth
rates of countries such as France, Germany, Belgium the United Kingdom or Italy
declined by about 50% {see Figure 1. In France, an estimated 1:38 million children
were not born because of this decline. This gure amounts to 3:5% of the total French
population in 1914 (40 millions), and is comparable to the military losses which are
estimated at 1:4 million men.1 In short, the fertility decline doubled the already large
demographic impact of the war.
What prompted such a decline of fertility? Answering this question will shed light on
a phenomenon that shaped the European demography for the rest of the Twentieth
century. The conventional wisdom is that during the war fertility fell below its optimal
level because of the absence of men gone to ght.2 I challenge this view using the case
of France. I develop a model of fertility choice where a household in its childbearing
years during World War I faces three unanticipated shocks: (i) an increase in the
probability that its wife remains alone after the war; (ii) a partially-compensated loss
of its husband's income because of the mobilization; and (iii) a decline in productivity.
I calibrate these shocks to be consistent with French data and nd that the model
predicts a strong decline in fertility: 10% more pronounced than in the data, even
though it does not feature any physical separations of couples. The model also over-
predicts the post-war fertility increase by 31% and generates, as observed in the data,
1See Huber (1931, p. 413). Military losses include people killed and missing in action. They are
a lower bound on the death toll of the war since they do not include civilian losses.
2See, for example Huber (1931), Vincent (1946) and Festy (1984).
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a temporary rise in the age at birth after the war, due to the postponement of fertility
by the generations aected by the war.
The unit of analysis in the model is a nitely-lived household which, at the beginning
of age 1, is made of two adults: a husband and a wife. The household derives utility
from consumption and from the number children and adults it comprises. It can give
birth to children at age 1 and 2, but children are costly to raise. They require time,
goods, and a share consumption for an exogenously given number periods after they
are born. A husband supplies his time inelastically to the market in exchange for a
wage, while a wife splits her time between the market, where she faces a lower wage
than a husband, and raising children. The number of adults, from age 2 onward,
follows one of two possible regimes. In peacetime it remains constant. During a war
there is a positive probability that it decreases to one, i.e., that the wife remains alone
in the household. The war is unanticipated, but once it breaks out there is a positive
probability that it goes on for another period.
The quantitative strategy is the following. First, I calibrate the model's parameters
to t the time series of the French fertility rate from 1800 until the eve of World
War I. That is, I consider generations who entered their fertile years before the war
broke out. In this exercise I assume that peace prevails. Second, using the calibrated
parameters I compute the optimal choices of generations exposed to an unanticipated
war. To quantify the shocks implied by the war I use three statistics. First, I use the
military casualties relative to the number of men mobilized to calibrate the probability
that a wife remains alone after the war. Second, I use income data to calibrate the
proportion of uncompensated income loss by mobilized husbands. Third, I use data
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on output per worker to calibrate the reduction in wages that occurred during the war.
These shocks aect optimal fertility as follow. They induce a household to save more
and consume less than it would have otherwise, thereby raising the marginal utility of
its consumption. This results from the fact that, together, these shocks imply a drop
in contemporaneous and expected income, as well as in increase in income risk. The
increase in the marginal utility of consumption raises the cost of diverting resources
away from consumption and toward raising children. This eect is magnied by the
fact that the expected marginal benet of a child is lower when the expected number
of adults in the household decreases. Hence, the rst consequence of the war is an
instantaneous reduction of fertility, even though the model does not feature a physical
separation hindering the household's ability to have children. The war also induces an
age-1 household to postpone giving birth until later in life since the marginal utility
of a child, for an age 2 household who reduced its fertility at age 1, is high. This
eect is magnied if, in addition, the war is over once the household reaches age 2.
This inter temporal reallocation of births implies an increase in the age at birth that
is consistent with the French data. Third, the fact that labor productivity declined
noticeably during the war mitigates these eects because it implies a reduction in
women's productivity, thereby lowering the cost of children. Quantitatively, this
eect is dominated by the loss of expected income.
Calibrating the parameters to t the time series of the French fertility rate before
the war is informative for assessing the eect of the war on fertility. The reason is
that the time series exhibits a downward trend which imposes a limit on the size of
the income and substitution eects of wages on fertility. In particular, the income
eect from rising wages needs to be dominated by the substitution eect in order for
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fertility to decline in the model as in the French time series. Since the war is itself a
combination of contemporaneous and expected income shocks, the discipline imposed
by the time series on the size of the income eect on fertility is relevant for assessing
the impact of the war.
This paper contributes to an already large literature focusing on the determinants of
fertility across countries and over time. Seminal work was done by Barro and Becker
(1988) and Barro and Becker (1989). Galor and Weil (2000) analyze the \-shaped
pattern of fertility over the long-run. Greenwood et al. (2005) propose of theory of
the baby boom in the United States. Jones et al. (2008) review alternative theories
explaining the negative relationship between income and fertility across countries and
over time. The eect of a war on fertility is explored, in the case of World War II and
the U.S. baby boom, by Doepke et al. (2007). Albanesi and Olivetti (2010) evaluate
the eects of technological improvements in maternal health. Jones and Schoonbroodt
(2011) theorize endogenous fertility cycles. Manuelli and Seshadri (2009) ask why do
fertility rates vary so much across countries? Bar and Leukhina (2010) investigate,
simultaneously, the demographic transition and the industrial revolution. Also related
is the work by Ohanian and McGrattan (2008): an example where economic theory
is used to investigate the eect of the scal shock that World War II represented for
the U.S. economy; and the work of Barro (2006), Barro and Ursua (2008) and Barro
and Jin (2011) on economic disasters and their impact on nancial markets. Finally,
Abramitzky et al. (2011) evaluate the impact of World War I on assortative matching
in the marriage market in France. Sommer (2009) shows that in the U.S. since the
1960s, the age at birth is increasing in the degree of labor market risk.
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The paper is organized as follows. In the next Section I present facts relative to the
number of births and deaths during the war as well as to the composition of the Army.
I argue that, although the mobilization was large, even mobilized men might have
had the opportunity to have children. I also discuss relevant facts pertaining to the
marriage market and the situation of women during the war. In Section 3 I develop
the model and discuss the determinants of optimal fertility and, in particular, the
mechanisms through which the war aects fertility decisions. Section 4 presents the
quantitative analysis of the model that is rst the calibration strategy, second the
results of various computational experiments designed at assessing the eect of the
war on fertility. It also presents a few experiments to evaluate the sensitivity of the
main results to the choice of some parameters. Section 5 concludes.
2 Facts
Some data are from the French census. The last census before the war was in 1911.
The rst census in the post-war era was in 1921. A census was scheduled in 1916 but
was cancelled. This data, and the data from previous censuses, were systematically
organized in the 1980s and made available from the Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research (ICPSR). It is also available from the French National
Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (Insee). Vital statistics are available
during the war years for the 77 regions (departements) not occupied by the Germans.
There was a total of 87 regions in France at the beginning of the war. Huber (1931)
provides a wealth of data on the french population before, during and after the war.
It also contains a useful set of income-related data.
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2.1 Births and Deaths
The birth rate, such as in Figure 1, is a measure of contemporaneous fertility. Figure
2 shows two other standard measures, the Total Fertility rate and completed fertility.
They both convey a message similar to that of Figure 1. Completed fertility is of
particular interest since it is a measure of lifetime fertility, namely the number of
children born to a woman of a particular generation throughout her fertile life. Figure
2 shows that the women who reached their twenties during the First World War gave
birth, throughout their lives, to less children than the generations that preceded or
followed them. Thus, even though there is evidence, discussed later, that these women
postponed their fertility until after the war was over, they did not fully compensate the
forgone births of the war. If they had, their completed fertility would have remained
unaected by the war since one less child today would be made up for by one more
child later on.
The demographic consequences of the fertility decline in France was large and per-
sistent. Consider Figure 3 which shows the age and sex structure of the population
before the war, in 1910, and after the war, in 1930, 1950 and 1970. The dierences
between the pre- and post-war population structures are quite noticeable. The rst
eects of the war are visible in the 1930 panel. First, there is a decit of men (relative
to women) in the 30-50 age group. These are the men that fought during World War
I and died. Second, there is a decit of men and women in the teens. This is the
generation that should have been born during the war but was not because of the
fertility decline. The 1950 panel shows again the same phenomenon 20 years later.
The men who died at war should have been in the 50-70 age group, and the gener-
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ation not born during the war should have been in its thirties. Note also the decit
of births that occurred in the early 1940s, that is during World War II. What caused
this? It could have been that, as during World War I, individuals had less children
because of World War II. For the French, however, the impact of World War II was
quite dierent than that of World War I, possibly because the ghting did not last as
long. In fact, the birth rate in the 1940s shows a noticeable increase.3 Thus, births
were low in the 1940s because the generation that was in its childbearing period at
that moment, e.g. of age 25 in 1940, was born in and around World War I. This
generation was unusually small, so it gave birth to unusually little children despite
a high birth rate. So, the decit of births during World War I lead, mechanically,
to another decit in births 25 years later not because of a reduction in fertility, but
because of a reduction in the size of the fertile population. The 1970 panel shows
that, as late as in the seventies, the demographic impact of World War I is still quite
noticeable. The generation that should have been born during the war should, by
then, have reached its fties.
The rst month of World War I was August 1914, but the rst severe reduction in
the number of live births occurred nine months later: it dropped from 46,450 in April
1915 to 29,042 in May {a 37% decline.4 During the course of the war the minimum
was attained in November 1915 when 21,047 live births were registered. The pre-
war level of births was reached again in December 1919. To put these numbers in
perspective consider Figure 4, which shows the number of births per month in France
3One can argue that the baby boom was already under way in the early 1940s in France. Green-
wood et al. (2005) propose of theory of the baby boom based on technical progress in the household
that is consistent with this view.
4See Bunle (1954, Table XI, p. 309).
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and Germany from January 1906 until December 1921. The trend lines provide an
estimation of the number of births that would have realized if during the war the
trends that prevailed from 1906 to 1914 had remained. For France, the dierence
between the actual number of births and the trend, summed between May 1915 (9
months after the declaration of war) and August 1919 (9 months after the armistice),
yields an estimated 1.36 million children not born. This gure amounts to 3.4% of the
French population in 1914 (40 million) and is comparable to the total death toll of the
war for the French: 1.4 million.5 The estimate for Germany is 3.18 million children
not born. It amounts to 4.8% of the German population in 1911 (65 million) and
exceeds the number of military deaths estimated at 2 million.6 In short, the fertility
reduction that occurred during World War I doubled the demographic impact of
the war. Similar calculations, made by demographers, lead to comparable gures:
Vincent (1946) reports a decit of 1.6 million French births because of the war and
Festy (1984) reports 1.4 million.
It is interesting to compare the fertility reduction of the war to the so-called Baby
Boom. The drop in the birth rate between before the war (1913) and the trough
(1916) is 50% over 3 years. The Baby Boom started in 1941, when the birth rate was
13.1 and peaked in 1947 at 21.3. The dierence between the two gures is a 62%
increase over 6 years. By this measure the eect of World War I, on impact, is quite
large relative to that of the Baby Boom. Yet, the Baby Boom lasted longer than
World War I and, therefore, its nal eect on the French population is larger.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the case of France was not unique. This already
5See Huber (1931, p. 413).
6See Huber (1931, pp. 7 and 449).
9
transpired in Figures 1 and 4. Figure 5 shows, in addition, the age and sex structure
of the populations of Germany, Belgium, Italy as well as Europe as a whole and the
United States in 1950. All European countries exhibit a decit of births during the
war which, as is the case for France, is still noticeable in the 1950 population. The
United States, on the contrary, were not noticeably aected by the war. The United
Kingdom appears to have experienced a reduced decit of births during World War
I compared with other European countries. Europe as a whole exhibits a noticeable
decit.
2.2 The Army
The mobilization was massive. A total of 8.5 million men served in the French army
over the course of the war, while the size of the 20-50 male population is estimated
at 8.7 million on January 1st 1914. On August 1st 1914, the day of the mobilization,
the army counted already 1 million men. The remaining 7.5 million were called to
serve throughout the four years of the war.7
Not all the men serving in the army were sent to the front. On July 1st, 1915, there
were 5 million men in the army but 2.3 million of them served in the rear. These
men were serving in factories, public administrations and in the elds to help with
the production of food for the troops and the population.8 Between August 1914 and
November 1918, the fraction of men in the army actually serving in the rear remained
between 30 and 50%. The men in the rear were in touch with the civilian population
and, therefore, were more likely to have the opportunities to procreate than the men
7See Huber (1931, p. 89).
8See Huber (1931, p. 105).
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at the front.
The combat troops did not spent all their time at the front either. Leaves from the
front were generalized in June 1915. Starting in October 1916 soldiers at the front
were granted 7 days of leave every 4 months, not including the time needed to travel
back to their families. These leaves could also be augmented at the discretion of one's
superior ocer. These leaves augmented the physical opportunities to have children.
2.3 Women
Figure 6 shows evidence that the women reaching their childbearing years during
World War I postponed their childbearing decisions. This observation is important
to understand the behavior of fertility after the war. Fertility was above trend in the
immediate aftermath of the war in part because the generations that could have given
birth during the war did so after, together with the younger post-war generations. In
the model of Section 3 households are allowed to choose how many children to have in
2 periods of their lives to allow this mechanism to operate and assess its importance
for the post-war recovery of fertility. As mentioned in Section 2.1, however, this catch-
up eect after the war, that is the above-trend fertility of older generations, was not
enough to compensate for the lost births of the war. This is why the completed
fertility of the generations reaching their twenties during the war was less than that
of other generations {see Figure 2.
Henry (1966) shows that the marriage market was noticeably perturbed for the gen-
erations reaching their marriage and childbearing years during World War I. Women
born in 1891-1895 (aged 21 in 1914) either got married before the war or after the war.
11
In the latter case, that is just after the war, the marriage rate of this generation was
abnormally high relative to the marriage rates of other generations at the same age:
a sign of \recuperation" of postponed marriages. A similar result holds true for the
generation of women born in 1896-1900. By some metric, however, the perturbation
of the marriage market due to World War I was \short-lived." Henry (1966) reports
that the proportion of single women, at the age of 50 for the 1891-1895 generation
is 12.5% and for the 1896-1900 generation it is 11.9%. These gures compare with
similar gures for generations whose marriage decisions were not aected by the war
such as the 1851-1855 generation: 11.2% or the 1856-1860 generation: 11.3%. Henry
(1966) concludes that the replacement of the men killed during the war was done
through immigration and excess marriage rates for men who did not disappear dur-
ing the war years. At this stage, two observations are worth making. First, although
ex-post (that is at the age of 50) the women from the 1891-1895 and 1896-1900 gen-
erations achieved the same marriage rate as the women from other generations, from
the perspective of 1914, when they had to decide whether to get married and have
children, the probability of keeping (or replacing) a husband must have appeared
quite dierent to them than to the previous generations at the same age. Second,
the disruption in the marriage market does not imply that births should be aected.
Although it is common, it is not necessary to be married to have children. Figure
7 shows that the proportion of out-of-wedlock births increased signicantly during
the war. Thus it seems reasonable, as a rst approximation, to study fertility choices
while abstracting from the marriage market.
Little information is available on female labor during the war. There was no exhaus-
tive census available. Some were planned during the course of the war but ended
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up being cancelled. Robert (2005) reports that the best information available is
from seven surveys conducted by work inspectors. These surveys did not cover all
branches of the economy such as railways and state-owned rms. However, data are
available for 40,000 to 50,000 establishments in food, chemicals, textile, book produc-
tion, clothing, leather, wood, building, metalwork, transport and commerce. These
establishments employed about 1.5 million workers before the war: about a quarter
of the labor force in industry and commerce. Robert (2005, Table 9.1) reports the
total number employed and the number of women employed in the establishments
surveyed. Although this is not the participation rate per se it gives a picture of fe-
male labor during the war. The share of women worker was 30% in July 1914 and
peaked in January 1915 at 38.2%. It then declined slowly throughout the war and
during the following years. It was 32% in July 1920. Downs (1995) and Schweitzer
(2002) emphasize that the increase in women's participation during the war is mod-
erated by the fact that most, that is between 80 and 95%, of the women who worked
during the war also worked in more feminized sectors before the war. Downs (1995,
page 48) writes
In the popular imagination, working women had stepped from domes-
tic obscurity to the center of production, and into the most traditionally
male of industries. In truth, the war brought thousands of women from the
obscurity of ill-paid and ill-regulated works as domestic servant, weavers
and dressmakers into the brief limelight of weapons production.
In the model of Section 3 a woman's labor is exogenous which, in light of the evidence
just presented, is a reasonable abstraction.
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2.4 Similar Episodes
Caldwell (2004) presents evidence of fertility decline for a list of thirteen social crises
among which the English Civil War, the French Revolution, the American Civil War,
World War I, etc... For each episode he reports signicant reductions in fertility {see
Table 1. He also reports that when fertility was already experiencing a declining
trend, the reductions observed during the periods of unrest are signicantly more
pronounced than before and after. For example, the Spanish birth rate fell as much
during the Civil War (1935-42) than during the 35 years before. These observations
suggest that episodes of great uncertainty matter for fertility choices, even when
individuals may not be physically separated.
3 The Model
3.1 The Environment
Time is discrete. The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals
living for I + J periods: I as a child and J as an adult. When an individual becomes
adult it leaves the household in which it was born, and pairs with another adult of
the same age and the opposite sex to form a new household of age 1. The household
formation process is exogenous. Only households make decisions.
There are two sources of uncertainty. At the aggregate level the economy evolves
through periods of war and peace, and at the household level the number of adults
is also a random variable whose probability distribution depends upon the aggregate
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state of the economy, i.e., whether it is peace or war. Let !t 2 
 = fwar; peaceg be
a random variable describing whether the economy is in a state of war or peace. At
date t the current state !t is realized before any decisions are made. The households'
perception, at date t, of the likelihood of war or peace at t+ 1 is summarized by the
probability distribution qt(!
0):
qt(!
0) = Pr (f!t+1 = !0g) :
Let mj 2 M = f1; 2g denote the number of adult(s) in an age-j household. Assume
that mj is realized at the beginning of the period, before any decisions are made, and
that it is described by a Markov chain with a transition function depending upon
whether the economy is in a state of peace or war:
p!(m
0jm) = Pr (fmj+1 = m0gjfmj = mg) ;
and initial condition m1 = 2 since all households are formed with two adults. Assume
that during peacetime the number of adults is constant so that
ppeace(m
0jm) = I(fm0 = mg)
while during a war there is a non-zero probability that a wife remains alone in the
next period:
pwar(1j2) > 0:
The exact value of pwar(1j2) is determined in Section 4.2. Since households are formed
with two members and remain as such during peacetime there are no one-adult house-
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holds when the war breaks out. Assume that p!(1j1) = 1; i.e., a wife does not remarry
once she is alone. One can interpret pwar(1j2) as the probability that a husband dies
during the war and his wife does not remarry. Therefore, the probability pwar(2j2) is
either that of a husband surviving the war or dying but his wife re-marrying.
A household is fecund twice during its life, at age 1 and 2. That is, it chooses how
many children to give birth to only at age 1 and 2, and only if there are two adults.
The number of children born to an age-j (j = 1; 2) household is denoted bj. They
remain present until the household reaches age I+j 1. The stock of children present
in an age-j household, denoted by nj, is
nj = b1If1  j  Ig+ b2If2  j  I + 1g: (1)
A household's preferences are represented by
E
(
JX
j=1
j 1 ~U (cj; nj;mj)
)
where
~U(c; n;m) = U

c
(n;m)

+ V (n;m)
and E is the expectation operator. The parameter  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount
factor, cj is total household consumption at age j and (n;m) is an adult-equivalent
scale. The parameter  is positive. Assume the following functional form:
U(x) =
x1 
1   and V (n;m) = (n
 +m)1=
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with  > 0 and   1.
At this stage a few observations are in order. First, a household values consumption
per (adult equivalent) member and not total consumption. Thus, one of the costs of
having a child is a reduction of consumption per (adult equivalent) member. Note also
that the introduction of the adult-equivalent scale aects the way the marginal cost of
a child changes when the number of adult decreases. To understand this, remember
that the marginal utility of consumption measures the cost of diverting resources
away from consumption and into childrearing. Suppose now that an adult disappears.
Then, total consumption decreases and if a household valued total consumption the
marginal cost of a child would increase by a magnitude dictated by the slope of U .
Since instead a household values consumption per (adult equivalent) member, this
eect is mitigated by the fact that the decrease of total consumption together with a
decrease of the number of adults implies less of a reduction of the consumption per
(adult equivalent) member and, therefore, less of an increase in the marginal cost of
a child. Second, children of the same age (born in the same period) and of dierent
age (born in dierent periods) are perfect substitutes in utility. This assumption is
made for simplicity. Third, the degree of substitutability between children and adults
depends on , the value of which is disciplined by data in the quantitative exercise
of Section 4. When  = 1 children and adults are perfect substitutes. As  decreases
children and adults become more complementary. In the limit, as !  1, children
and adults are perfect complement. The value of  is important for the eect of an
exogenous shock to the number of adults, m, on fertility. If children and adults are
perfect substitute, a decrease of the number of adults can be compensated by an
increase in fertility, holding everything else constant. If, however, children and adults
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are complement, a decrease of the number of adults implies a reduction of the optimal
number of children. Fourth, the number of adults acts as a preference shock through
two channels: (i) a decrease of the number of adults directly aects utility and, in
particular, it reduces the marginal utility of children through V ; (ii) a decrease of the
number of adults implies an increase in consumption per (adult equivalent) member,
holding everything else constant. Beside the eect of m on preferences, a decrease of
the number of adults also acts as an income shock. This is described in what follows.
Adults are endowed with one unit of productive time per period. A husband supplies
his time inelastically while a wife allocates hers between raising children and working.
A child requires  units of a wife's time and e units of the consumption good for each
period during which it is present in the household. The parameter  represents the
state of the \childrearing" technology and, therefore, is not a control variable. Thus,
a wife's time allocation is indirectly controlled through the number of children she
gives birth to. The wage rate for a husband is denoted by wmt and is assumed to grow
at the constant (gross) rate g > 1 per period: wmt+1 = gw
m
t : Similarly, the wage rate
for a wife is denoted wft and is assumed to grow at rate g too. It is convenient to
dene the function
Lt(m;!) =
8><>: w
f
t + w
m
t (1  !) when m = 2
wft when m = 1
as the \potential" labor income of a household, i.e., the labor income it would receive
if no time was devoted to raising children. Note that when there is one adult in the
household it is assumed to be the wife. When there are two adults but there is a war
the husband's income is reduced by a fraction war 2 (0; 1). Thus, 1  war measures
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the compensation received from the government during a war, when the husband is
mobilized and cannot perform his regular job. In the case where war = 1 there is no
compensation and the husband's income is totally lost to the household. If war = 0
the husband's income loss is totally compensated. Let peace = 0. A household has
access to a one-period, risk-free bond with (gross) rate of interest 1=. It can freely
borrow and lend any amount at this rate. It owns no assets at the beginning of age
1.
3.2 Optimization
At date t an age-1 household is made of 2 adults. It has no assets and no children.
It decides to consume (c) save (a0) and how many children to give birth to (b1). Its
value function writes
W1;t(!) = max
c;b1;a0
~U(c; b1; 2) + 
X
m02M
X
!02

W2;t+1 (a
0; b1;m0; !0) p!(m0j2)qt(!0) (2)
subject to
c+ a0 + b1

e+ wft

= Lt(2; !) (3)
The only relevant state variable for a household, beside time, is the aggregate state
of the economy, !.9 The right-hand side of the budget constraint (3) shows the
\potential" labor income of a household. The time cost of raising b1 children appears
as an expenditure on the left-hand side: wft b1. Thus, the eective labor income
is Lt(2; !)   b1wft . The function W2;t+1 (a0; b1;m0; !0) is the value function of a
9Since wages are deterministic, time is the only state variable needed to know the current and
future wages.
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household of age 2 with a0 assets accumulated, b1 children born at age 1, m0 surviving
adults, and facing the aggregate state !0. Note that at age 1 the number of children
born and the number of children present in the household are the same since n1 = b1,
as per Equation (1). Note, nally, that b1 is a relevant state variable for an age 2
household whenever I  2 as assumed here.
An age-2 household at date t learns its number of adults, m, and the aggregate state
of the economy, !, and decides to consume (c) save (a0) and how many children to
give birth to (b2). Its optimization problem writes
W2;t (a; b1;m; !) = max
c;b2;a0
~U(c; b1 + b2;m)
+ 
X
m02M
X
!02

W3;t+1 (a
0; b1; b2;m0; !0) p!(m0jm)qt(!0) (4)
subject to
c+ a0 + (b1 + b2)

e+ wft

= Lt(m;!) +
a

(5)
and b2 = 0 whenever m = 1. The right-hand side of the budget constraint represents
total income: the sum of \potential" labor income as well as income from assets
accumulated during the previous period. The time cost of raising the children present
in the household at age 2 appears as an expenditure on the left-hand side. As per
Equation (1) the number of children present in the household at age 2 is n2 = b1+ b2.
The function W3;t+1 (a
0; b1; b2;m0; !0) is the value function of an age 3 household at
date t+1 with a0 assets accumulated, m0 adults, b1 children born at age 1, b2 children
born at age 2 and facing the state !0. Note that, even though there are no births
after age 2, the household must keep track of the number of children born at age 1
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and 2 in order to assess the childrearing cost it is facing each period, as well as to
compute its (adult equivalent) size.
From age 3 onward the only choices are consumption (c) and savings (a0). The
number of children, nj, evolves in line with the law of motion described by Equation
(1). Formally, the optimization problem writes
Wj;t (a; b1; b2;m; !) = max
c;a0
~U(c; nj;m)
+ 
X
m02M
X
!02

Wj+1;t+1 (a
0; b1; b2;m0; !0) p!(m0jm)qt(!0)
subject to
c+ a0 + nj

e+ wft

= Lt(m;!) +
a

(6)
n : given by Equation (1)
j > 2
and a0 = 0 when j = J .
3.2.1 Optimality Conditions
The rst order conditions for consumption and savings at age 1 imply the Euler
equation:
U 0

c
(b1; 2)

1
(b1; 2)
= E1;t

@
@a0
W2;t+1(a
0; b1;m0; !0)

(7)
where E1;t is the expectation operator, conditioning on the information available to
an age-1 individual at date t, and derived from the probability distributions qt and
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p!. The marginal cost of a reduction in household consumption, measured on the
left-hand side, is the marginal utility of consumption per (adult equivalent) member.
The marginal benet is the expected marginal gain at age 2, measured on the right-
hand side of the equation. The rst order conditions for consumption and fertility
can be rearranged into

@
@b1
V (b1; 2) + E1;t

@
@b1
W2;t+1(a
0; b1;m0; !0)

=
U 0

c
(b1; 2)

1
(b1; 2)


e+ wft +
c
(b1; 2)
@
@b1
1(b1; 2)

(8)
where the left-hand side is the marginal benet of a child born at age 1, and the right-
hand side is the marginal cost. The marginal benet comprises two parts: the instan-
taneous benet at age 1, measured by @V (b1; 2)=@b1, and the expected marginal ben-
et (net of future costs) from age 2 onward measured by E1;t [@W2;t+1(a
0; b1;m0; !0)=@b1].
The marginal cost comprises three elements. The rst two are the resource cost of
raising the child, e, and the time cost, i.e., the loss of a fraction of the wife's labor
income, wft . The third element is the allocation of consumption to the newborn.
The new child represents an increase of @(b1; 2)=@b1 adult-equivalent, thus it re-
ceives c=(b1; 2)  @(b1; 2)=@b1 units of consumption. These three costs, expressed
in consumption units, are weighted by the marginal utility of consumption per (adult
equivalent) member, U 0(c=(b1; 2))=(b1; 2).
There are two mechanisms through which the war aects fertility, the second magni-
fying the eect of the rst. First, the expected marginal benet of a child (left-hand
side of 8) decreases during the war. This is because the war implies a reduction of the
expected number of adults and because the marginal utility of a child is increasing
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in the number of adults: Vnm > 0. The second reason why the war reduces optimal
fertility is because it also implies an increase of the marginal cost of raising a child.
This increase occurs because consumption decreases during the war and, therefore, its
marginal utility increases, i.e. the cost of diverting resources away from consumption
and toward raising a child increases. The decrease in consumption results from (i) the
decrease in expected income due to the probability that the wife remains alone after
the war; the decrease in contemporaneous income due to the husband's mobilization
and loss of labor productivity; (iii) the increase in savings due to increased risk with
respect to m.
In Section 4.1 the model's parameters are calibrated to t the time trend of fertility
before the First World War. It is worth, then, discussing the mechanism through
which the model is able to generate a downward slopping trend in fertility. Following
the approach in Greenwood et al. (2005), the mechanism leading to a long-run decline
in fertility is an increase in the opportunity cost of raising children resulting from wage
growth. Note that growth in a wife's wage implies both an income and a substitution
eect while growth in a husband's wage only implies an income eect. As is common
in a time allocation problem the nal eect of wage growth on fertility depends upon
preferences and, in particular, the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal
utility of a child. For fertility to decline the income eect resulting from the growth of
both wm and wf needs to be more than oset by the substitution eect resulting from
the increase in wf . This imposes a limit on the rate at which the marginal utility
of consumption can decrease. (A decrease in the marginal utility of consumption
makes raising children more aordable: an income eect.) Given the relevance of the
marginal utility of consumption to assess the eect of the war on fertility, as discussed
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above, the time series of fertility in the years prior to the First World War can be used
to impose quantitative discipline on the parameters of the model and, in particular,
 and ; the latter controlling the marginal benet of a child. This is the strategy
followed in Section 4.1.
At age 2 the Euler Equation and optimality condition for fertility are
U 0

c
(b1 + b2;m)

1
(b1 + b2;m)
= E2;t

@
@a0
W3;t+1(a
0; b1; b2;m0; !0)

(9)
and

@
@b2
V (b1 + b2;m) + E2;t

@
@b2
W3;t+1(a
0; b1; b2;m0; !0)

=
U 0

c
(b1 + b2;m)

1
(b1 + b2;m)


e+ wf +
c
(b1 + b2;m)
@
@b2
(b1 + b2;m)

(10)
which have the same interpretations as Equations (7) and (8). When m = 1 a
household cannot have children, therefore b2 = 0 and Equation (10) does not hold
with equality.
At age 3 and above the only choice faced by a household is that of consumption and
savings. The optimality conditions for consumption and savings are then summarized
by the Euler equation
U 0

c
(nj;m)

1
(nj;m)
= Ej;t

@
@a0
Wj+1;t+1(a
0; b1; b2;m0; !0)

:
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4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section I calibrate the model's parameters to t the time series of the French
fertility rate from 1800 until the eve of World War I. This time series, and in particular
the pace at which it declines through time, is informative to restrict the parameters
of the model {see Section 3.2.1. Using the calibrated parameters I conduct a set of
experiments where I compute the optimal decisions of the generations reaching their
childbearing years during an unanticipated war and after. In the rst experiment,
which I refer to as the \baseline," the generations reaching their childbearing years
during the war experience three shocks that their predecessors did not: a higher risk
that a wife remains alone in the household at the beginning of the next period, a
partially-compensated loss of a husband's income during the war, and a permanent
drop in labor productivity. This experiment provides a quantitative assessment of the
eect of the war on optimal fertility. I also conduct counterfactual experiments to
decompose the contribution of the shocks. First, I report the optimal fertility implied
by the model when abstracting from the income loss during the war while maintaining
the increased risk that a wife remains alone as well as the loss of labor productivity.
Second I report the results of an exercise where both the income loss during the war,
and the reduction in labor productivity are as in the baseline, but the risk that a wife
remains alone is nil. Finally, I compute the optimal fertility that would prevail had
there been no loss of labor productivity. Finally, I also discuss the sensitivity of the
baseline results with respect to the choice of some parameters.
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4.1 Calibration
Amodel period is 5 years. Thus, an individual of age 1 in the model can be interpreted
as a child between the age of 0 and 5 in the data. Let I = 4 and J = 7 so that an
individual remains in the household in which it was born until it reaches the age of 15-
20, and a young household is composed of two individuals between the age of 20 and
25. Households in the model have their children during the rst and second period of
their adult lives, which correspond to their 20s in the data. Life ends between the age
of 50 and 55. An optimal path of fertility is a vector of 26 observations corresponding
the the calendar years 1806; 1811; : : : ; 1931:
Let the rate of interest on the risk free asset be 4% per year. This implies a subjective
discount factor  = 1:04 5. I assume that wm and wf grow at the same, constant
(gross) rate g from some initial conditions. I use the rate of growth of the Gross
National Product per capita, 1:6% per year, to calibrate g {see Carre et al. (1976,
Tables 1.1 and 2.3). Thus, g = 1:0165. I normalize the initial condition (corresponding
to 1806 in the data) for wm to 1 and I assume a constant gender gap in wages wf=wm.
Huber (1931, pp. 932-935) reports gures for the daily wages for men and women in
agriculture, industry and commerce in 1913. In industry, a woman's wage in 1913 was
52% of a man's. In agriculture the gap was 64%, and in commerce it was 77%. Since
commerce was noticeably smaller than agriculture and industry I use wf=wm = 0:6.
In Section 4.4 I present sensitivity results with respect to wf=wm. Note that a gender
gap in earnings of 60% is consistent with the ndings of the more recent literature
studying the United States. Blau and Kahn (2006, Figure 2.1) report that women
working full-time earned between 55% and 65% of what men earned from the 1950s
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to the 1980s. Knowles (2010) reports that, throughout the 1960s, the ratio of mean
wages of women to those of men was slightly below 60% in the U.S.
For , the adult-equivalent scale, I use the \OECD-modied equivalence scale" which
assigns a value of 1 to the rst adult member in a household, 0.5 to the second adult
and 0.3 to each child:
(n;m) =
1
2
+
m
2
+ 0:3n:
There are four remaining parameters: , , , and  . I calibrate them to minimize
a distance between the model's predicted time series of fertility and the actual time
series in France before the war. In the model the war breaks out in 1916. Since the
1911 generation gives birth to children in 1911 and 1916 it is only aected by the war,
which I assume to be unanticipated, in 1916. Thus, for this procedure I use data up
to and including the fertility rate in 1911 and I assume that there are no wars and
that individuals do not anticipate any:
!t = peace and qt(peace) = 1 for t = 1806; 1811; : : : ; 1911:
Formally, let  = (; ; ; )0 be the vector of remaining parameters. I chose them to
solve the following minimization problem:
min

X
t2I
(ft()  ft)2 + (  n1911()  0:1)2 (11)
where I is an index set: I = f1806; 1811; 1816; : : : ; 1911g. This objective function
deserves a few comments. First, ft() is the fertility rate implied by the model for a
given value of . Since women in households of age 1 and 2 give births at each date,
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ft() is the sum of births from these two generations at date t, divided by 2. Second,
ft is the empirical counterpart of ft().
10 Third, n1906() is the total number of
children born to the 1906 generation. Thus, the second part of the objective function
is the distance between the time spent by this generation raising its children and its
empirical counterpart, 10%. The latter gure comes from Aguiar and Hurst (2007,
Table II). They report that in the 1960s a woman in the U.S. spends close to 6 hours
per week on various aspect of childcare, that is primary, educational and recreational.
This amounts to 10% of the sum of market work, non-market work and childcare (61
hours). Thus,  is set to imply that the time spent by a women on childcare, on the
eve of the war, is 10% as well. The good cost of raising a child is assumed to be zero,
i.e., e = 0. Note that if e was proportional to wf that is, if the good cost of raising
a child was growing at rate g, then setting e to 0 would be innocuous since e could
be subsumed into  . In Section 4.4 I present sensitivity results with respect to the
target gure for the time cost of raising a child.
Although , ,  and  are determined simultaneously, some aspects of the data are
more important than others for some parameters. The level of fertility, in particular,
is critical to discipline the parameter  which measures the intensity of a household's
taste for children. The time cost of a child, that is 10% of a woman's time, is critical in
determining the value of  . The parameter  determines the curvature of the marginal
utility of consumption and, since the number of adults in a household in constant,
the parameter  determines the curvature of the marginal utility of fertility. Thus the
decline in fertility which results from a comparison between its marginal cost (partly
10I construct a time series of the French fertility rate using the birth rate and the proportion of
women between the age of 15 and 44 from Mitchell (1998).
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driven by the marginal utility of consumption) and its marginal benet, disciplines
the parameters  and . As discussed in Section 3.2.1, the discipline imposed by the
time series of fertility on these parameters is relevant to assess the eect of the war
on fertility. The calibrated parameters are displayed in Table 2. Figure 8 displays
the computed and actual fertility rate for the pre-war period.
4.2 Baseline Experiment
In the experiment I assume that the war breaks out in 1916 and that it lasts for one
period:
!1916 = war and !t = peace for t > 1916:
I use three dierent values for q1916(war), i.e., the perceived likelihood that the war will
lasts one more period: 0, 10 and 20%. I use these values to evaluate the quantitative
importance of this parameter which is dicult to discipline empirically.11
I calibrate pwar(1j2), the probability that a wife is alone in the next period as
pwar(1j2) = military losses of World War I
total men mobilized
:
The military losses where 1:4 millions while 8:5 million men were mobilized. Thus,
I use pwar(1j2) = 1:4=8:5 = 0:16. This gure is not perfect. On the one hand it
might exaggerate the risk from the perspective of a wife since she has the possibility
of remarrying after the war if her husband died. This possibility would allow a wife
11The literature on disasters, such as Barro (2006) and Barro and Ursua (2008), emphasizes the
importance of the probability of a disaster occurring, while q1916(war) is the probability that the
war goes on for one more period conditional on being ongoing already.
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to raise her children with hers and another husband's income. On the other hand
the probability may underestimate the risk since the husband may survive the war
but come home disabled. In the case of World War I this was a distinct possibility
since the massive use of artillery and gases made this conict quite dierent from
any other conict before. Huber (1931, p. 448) reports 4.2 million wounded during
the war: half of the men mobilized. The number of invalid was 1.1 million among
which 130,000 were mutilated and 60,000 were amputated. In Section 4.4 I present
sensitivity results with respect to pwar(1j2) to address these concerns
Households did not get fully compensated for the income loss they incurred while the
men were mobilized. Downs (1995) cites a compensation amounting to somewhere
between 35 and 60% of a man's pre-war salary in agriculture or industry.12 To repre-
sent this loss, I set war = 0:5. In Section 4.4 I present sensitivity results with respect
to the magnitude of the income loss of the husband.
There is evidence that macroeconomic aggregates fell during the First World War.
Using data from the French national accounts, I compute a time series of real output
per worker and found that it is 28% lower in 1919 than in 1913.13 Figure 11 shows an
index of this time series. Note that this gure is consistent with Barro (2006, Table
1)'s reporting of a drop of 31% in real Gross Domestic Product per capita in France
(29% in Germany). I model this shock as permanent. That is, I impose that in 1916
wages drop by a fraction  below their trend:
wm1916 = (1  )gwm1911 and wf1916 = (1  )gwf1911
12See Downs (1995, p. 49) and Huber (1931, pp. 932-935).
13The data is from CEPII. It is available upon request or at can be downloaded at:
http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/villa/serlongues/crois.xls
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and that from this date onward they grow a the constant rate g. I use  = 0:3.
The results of this experiment are reported in Figure 9 and Table 3 for three values
of q1916(war): 0, 10% and 20%. Consider the case where q1916(war) = 0, that is
when households anticipate that the war lasts for one period only. The fertility rate
predicted by the model falls by 54% in 1916 relative to 1911, versus 49% in the data.
Thus, the model over-predicts the decline in fertility by 10% (54=49 = 1:10). After
the war fertility increases by 154% in the model versus 118% in the data. Thus
the model over-predicts the post-war increase by 31% (154=118 = 1:31). Figure 10
helps interpreting these results. It shows fertility by age at dierent point in time,
as predicted by the model. Observe that during the war households of age 1 and 2
reduce their fertility since they are both aected by the shocks associated with the
war. After the war fertility rises for households of age 1 and 2. There are two points
deserving a discussion at this stage. First, since the war is over in 1921, age 1 and 2
households at this time have fertility decisions that are consistent with the trend in
wages. Since the shock to wages is permanent, however, their fertility reaches higher
trends than before the war. Second, the fertility of age 2 households in 1921, that
is the 1916 generation who was of age 1 during the war, rises above trend. This is
because this generation postponed giving birth during the war and is catching up
after. A fact consistent with the pattern observed in the data of gure 6. This catch-
up eect does not compensate for the decit of births during the war, though. Thus,
the model predicts that the completed fertility of the 1916 generation is 25% below
trend. A fact that is consistent with the completed fertility data of Figure 2.
Turning to the cases where households expect that the war might last longer than
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one period, that is when q1916(war) = 10% and 20%, Table 3 reveals that both the
decline of fertility during the war, and the subsequent increase are exacerbated in
comparison with the case where households anticipate the war to last only one period.
When q1916(war) = 10%, fertility decreases by 55% vis-a-vis 49 in the data, therefore
exceeding the actual decline by 12%. When households perceive that the war has
a 20% probability of still being on in the next period, the fertility decline is 56%.
In these cases the increases in fertility between 1916 and 1921 are 162 and 169%,
respectively (v. 118% in the data). It should be noted that there are two eects of
an increase in q1916(war) that are osetting each other. On the one hand, an increase
in q1916(war) magnies the risk associated with the war and, therefore, exacerbates
the fertility adjustment caused by it. On the other hand, when a young household
expects the war to be over in the next period it has an incentive to reallocate births
into the future. This incentive is weakened by increases in the probability that, in
the future, the war can still be on. The results displayed in Table 3 show that this
mechanism is dominated by the rst one.
As transpires from the previous discussion, the assumption that the decline in wages
during the war is permanent is not innocuous. To assess its importance I conduct an
experiment where I assume that the decline in wages during the way is temporary.
That is, I assume wm1916 = (1 )gwm1911 and wf1916 = (1 )gwf1911 as above, but I also
assume that wm1921 = g
2wm1911 and w
f
1921 = g
2wf1911. I nd that in such case the decline
in fertility during the war is 54% as in the baseline and that the increase after the war
is 139% (v. 154 in the baseline). With a temporary drop in wages, the opportunity
cost of raising chidden after the war is higher than in the baseline, thus the catch-up
of fertility is less pronounced.
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This exercise shows that the combination of three shocks, the increase probability that
a wife remains alone after the war, the husband's inability to earn income during the
war, and the decrease in labor productivity imply large changes in optimal fertility,
over-predicting both the decrease observed during the war and the catch-up observed
after. Note again that although, in the model, husbands are unable to receive income
during the war, there are no physical separations of couples.
4.3 Decomposition
To evaluate the relative contributions of the shocks faced by households exposed to
the war during their fertile years I conduct three counterfactual experiments. Remem-
ber that in the baseline the three shocks representing the war are (war; pwar(1j2); ) =
(0:5; 0:16; 0:3). In each counterfactual experiment I abstract from one of these shocks
while leaving the two others achieve their baseline value. So, in the rst exper-
iment I abstract from the contemporaneous loss of income: (war; pwar(1j2); ) =
(0; 0:16; 0:3). In the second I abstract from the risk that a wife is alone after the
war: (war; pwar(1j2); ) = (0:5; 0; 0:3). In the last experiment, I abstract from the
permanent decrease in labor productivity: (war; pwar(1j2); ) = (0:5; 0:16; 0)
Figure 12 and Table 3 show the results of these experiments for dierent values of
q1916(war). In Experiment 1, that is when households are faced with the same risk of
loosing their husbands as in the baseline and the same decline in labor productivity,
but no contemporaneous income loss, i.e. (war; pwar(1j2); ) = (0; 0:16; 0:3), and when
q1916(war) = 0, the decrease of fertility between 1911 and 1916 is 44% versus 54 in
the baseline case. The post-war increase is 111% (v. 154 in the baseline). Although,
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these gures vary as q1916(war) changes, they remain proportional to the changes
generated by the baseline experiment. As Table 3 shows, the decline in fertility in
this experiment represents 80-81% of the decline generated by the baseline, regardless
of the value of q1916(war). The increase in fertility in this experiment amounts to 70-
72% of the increase generated by the baseline experiment, regardless of the value of
q1916(war). This result suggests that the bulk of the fertility changes caused by the
war can be attributed to the increased risk that wives would remain alone after the
war, and that this conclusion is robust to how likely households perceived that the
war would keep going.
When abstracting from the loss of expected income due to the risk that a wife remains
alone after the war (Experiment 2), and when q1916(war) = 0, the fertility decline
generated by the model amounts to 9% of the decline generated in the baseline, and
the post-war increase 6%. As with the rst experiment, these results are fairly robust
to the value used for q1916(war): It is not surprising that the risk that a wife remains
alone plays a larger role than the contemporaneous income loss for a household. The
latter is a temporary shock while the former is a permanent income shock. But,
in addition to being an income shock, a reduction of the number of adults is also a
preference shock, as discussed in Section 3.1, which also reduces the expected marginal
benet for a child.
The gures of Experiment 2 can be used to evaluate the decline in fertility that would
have occurred if households anticipated to replace deceased husbands for sure. Such
calculation is relevant because, as noted in Section 2.3, the women whose fertility
was aected by the war eventually married as the women of any other generations.
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Experiment 2 shows that if these women perceived no risk of raising their children
alone, then their fertility would have decreased by 5=49 = 10% of the actual decline
observed in the French data when q1916(war) = 0. This gure increases to 12 and 14%
when q1916(war) increases to 10 and 20%, respectively.
Experiment 3 shows how optimal fertility would have declined in the absence of the
drop of labor productivity during the war. The result is that fertility would have
declined more than in the baseline: 57% (v. 54 in the baseline) when q1916(war) = 0.
Thus the decline in labor productivity mitigates the eect of the war on fertility.
This results follows from the discipline imposed by the calibration of Section 4.1 on
the relative strength of income and substitution eects when wages are changing.
In particular, when both wages are growing at the same rate the substitution eect
dominates to yield the downward slopping trend in fertility. During the war, where the
experiment consists in a proportional reduction of both wm and wf , the substitution
eect dominates too, but in the opposite direction: the reduction of labor productivity
reduces the opportunity costs of having a child and, therefore, mitigates the decline
in fertility implied by the war.
4.4 Sensitivity
I consider alternative values for (i) the probability that a woman remains alone after
the war, pwar(1j2); (ii) the magnitude of the husband's income loss during the war,
war; (iii) the time cost of raising children,  ; and (iv) the gender wage gap in earnings,
wf=wm.
Consider two alternative values for pwar(1j2), the probability that a woman remains
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alone after the war: 10 and 20% instead of 16 in the baseline. In both cases the
baseline experiment of Section 4.2 is performed with the new value of pwar(1j2), while
assuming that q1916(war) = 0, that is households expect the war to last for one period
only. Table 4 reports the results. It transpires that this probability matters noticeably
for the results of the exercise but that, even in the conservative case where the risk
for a wife to remain alone is 10%, the model generates a strong decline in fertility:
41% versus 54 in the baseline and 49 in the data.
In the experiment of Section 4.2 a household loses 50% of a husband's income because
of mobilization. I consider two alternative values: one where the loss of income is 25%
and one where it is 75%. Performing the same experiment as in Section 4.2 with these
values implies results that are reported in Table 4. As the income loss gets smaller,
the model generates smaller decline in fertility and, consequently smaller increase
after the war. In the case of an income loss of 25% during the war, the model still
implies a strong decline in fertility: 49%.
Consider now alternative targets for the time cost of raising children. For each new
target the model needs to be calibrated again in exactly the same fashion as in Section
4.1 with the exception of the target in the second component of the objective function
(11). Then the experiment of Section 4.2 is performed. I consider two alternative
targets: a time cost of 5% and a time cost of 20%. The results are displayed in
Table 4. The model's prediction for the change in fertility is not monotonic in the
time cost of a child. It may appear \counter-intuitive" that the eect of the war on
fertility is not exacerbated when the cost of a child is larger than in the baseline,
e.g., when it is 20%. The reason for this result is that, as the target gure for the
36
time cost of a child changes, other parameters change too. In particular, a larger-
than-baseline time cost of raising a child implies, through the calibration procedure,
a higher value for : This can be understood as follows: as the opportunity cost of
raising a child increases the marginal cost increases too. Since the model is calibrated
to t the fertility data, marginal cost and marginal benet must be equalized at
the same fertility level. This implies that the marginal benet of a child must also
increase, which is achieve through higher values for  and . Higher values for ,
however, imply less complementarity between adults and children in utility. This, in
turn, makes the war less costly.
Finally, In Table 4 I report the results of an exercise where I consider alternative values
for wm=wf , the gender earning gap: 40 and 80%. As for the sensitivity analysis with
respect to  , the model's parameters are calibrated again for each alternative value
of wm=wf and the experiment of Section 4.2 is performed. The model generates large
variations in fertility in these experiments.
5 Conclusion
The human losses of World War I were not only on the battleeld. In France, the
number of children not born during the war was as large as military casualties (larger
in the case of Germany). The age structure of population in France and other Euro-
pean countries was signicantly changed by this event, and the eect lasted for the
rest of the Twentieth century. In this paper I argue that this phenomenon is more
than accounted for by the optimal decisions of households facing three shocks: an
increased risk that women remain alone after the war, a loss of income during the
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war due to the mobilization of men, and a reduction in labor productivity. These
shocks imply that young adults during the war see their contemporaneous and ex-
pected income decline. As a result they save more and consume less which increases
their cost of having children. The resulting drop in fertility is 10% larger than the
actual decline. The model is also able to generate the strong catch-up of fertility after
the war, mostly because of the inter temporal reallocation of births done by the young
generations during the war. The physical separation of couples which is often cited
to explain the fertility decline during the war may have been a factor of secondary
importance. This nding is consistent with a general pattern exhibited by fertility,
across countries and over time, i.e., it tends to decline during periods of signicant
unrest even though there may be no physical separations of couples.
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Table 1: Changes in Fertility for Countries Experiencing Major Social Upheavals
Country Episode Period Change in CBR (%)
England Civil War, Commonwealth,
and early Restoration 1641-66  17:3
France Revolution 1787-1804  22:5
USA Civil War 1860-70  12:8
Russia WWI and Revolution 1913-21  24:4
Germany War, revolution, defeat, ination 1913-1924  26:1
Austria War, defeat, empire dismembered 1913-24  26:9
Spain Civil war and dictatorship 1935-42  21:4
Germany War, defeat, occupation 1938-50  17:3
Japan War, defeat, occupation 1940-55  34:0
Chile Military coup and dictatorship 1972-78  22:3
Portugal Revolution 1973-85  33:3
Spain Dictatorship to democracy 1976-85  37:2
Eastern Europe Communism to capitalism 1986-98
Russia  56:0
Poland  40:0
Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic)  38:0
Source: Caldwell (2004, Table 1).
Note: CBR is Crude Birth Rate.
43
Table 2: Calibration
Preferences  = 1:04 5,  = 0:41,  =  0:13,  = 0:86
Wages wm = 1; wf = 0:6 for initial (1806) generation
g = 1:0165
Cost of children  = 1:01, e = 0
Adult equivalent scale (n;m) = 1=2 +m=2 + 0:3n
Demography I = 4, J = 7
Table 3: Main Experiments: Changes in Fertility During and After the War, Model
and French Data, %
q1916(war) =
0% 10% 20%
1911-16 1916-21 1911-16 1916-21 1911-16 1916-21
Data  49 +118  49 +118  49 +118
Baseline  54 +154  55 +162  56 +169
Baseline / Data 1:10 1:31 1:12 1:37 1:14 1:43
Exp. 1 (war = 0)  44 +111  44 +115  45 +119
Exp. 1 / Baseline 0:81 0:72 0:80 0:71 0:80 0:70
Exp. 2 (pwar(1j2) = 0)  5 +9  6 +11  7 +12
Exp. 2 / Baseline 0:09 0:06 0:11 0:07 0:13 0:07
Exp. 3 ( = 0)  57 +149  58 +157  59 +165
Exp. 3 / Baseline 1:06 0:97 1:05 0:97 1:05 0:98
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Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis: Changes in Fertility During and After the War when
q1916(war) = 0, Model and French Data, %
1911-16 1916-21
Data  49 +118
Baseline  54 +154
pwar(1j2) = 10%  41 +97
pwar(1j2) = 20%  58 +185
war = 25%  49 +131
war = 75%  59 +183
Time cost of children 5%  46 +111
Time cost of children 20%  52 +145
wf=wm = 0:4  64 +236
wf=wm = 0:8  47 +118
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Figure 1: Birth Rates in Some European Countries
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Figure 2: Total Fertility Rate and Completed Fertility in France
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Source: Insee, etat civil et recensement de population.
The total fertility rate in a given year measures the average number of children that would be born
to a women if she experienced, throughout her fertile life, the age-specic fertility rate observed that
year. Completed fertility is the average number of children born to a woman of a particular cohort,
once she has reached age 50.
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Figure 3: French Population by Age and Sex, January 1, Selected Years
1910 1930
1950 1970
Source: Insee, etat civil et recensement de population.
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Figure 4: Number of Births per Month in France and Germany
Note: The source of data is Bunle (1954, Table XI). The linear trends are estimated using the data
from January 1906 until July 1914. The shaded area is from May 1915, that is 9 months after the
declaration of War between France and Germany in August 1914, until August 1919 that is 9 months
after the armistice was signed in November 1918.
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Figure 5: Population by Age and Sex, Selected Countries, 1950
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Figure 6: Average and Median Age at Birth in France
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Figure 7: Proportion of Out-of-Wedlock Live Births in France
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Figure 8: Fertility Rate in France, Model and Data, 1806{1911
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Note: This gure displays the result of the calibration procedure where the model parameters are
chosen to t the time series of fertility during the pre-war period.
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Figure 9: Fertility Rate in France, Baseline Experiment and Data, 1806{1931,
q1916(war) = 0
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Figure 10: Fertility Rate Predicted by the Model by Age, Baseline Experiment, 1806{
1931, q1916(war) = 0
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Figure 11: Index of Output per Worker in France, 1896{1935
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Figure 12: Fertility Rate Predicted by the Model, Baseline and Counterfactual Ex-
periments, 1806{1931, q1916(war) = 0
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